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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Taxation-The Effect of Restrictive Stock Agreements in De-
termining the Value of Stock for Death Tax Purposes--After an
attempt was made by outsiders to gain control of a family-owned
corporation one stockholder agreed to sell his shares to another at forty
dollars per share, the sale to be completed prior to September 30, 1953.
Before the sale was effected the vendor died testate, leaving his entire
estate to the purchaser, who appealed from a county court ruling that
the contract price could not be taken into consideration in valuing the
stock for state inheritance tax purposes. Held: Affirmed. The value of
the legacy is not affected by the fact that the legatee holds an enforce-
able contract right to the stock which will not be exercised. The
Wisconsin Inheritance Tax is based on the interest to which the living
succeeds and that is valued at the clear market value. Estate of Michel,
262 Wis. 432, 55 N. W. 2d 388 (1952).
Contract rights to stock left by a decedent often arise from
restrictive stock agreements. These agreements may take many forms
but all are so designed that the stock held will not be disposed of
without giving other stockholders or the corporation a chance to
purchase it." They are one of the means through which holders of
closely held stock of small corporations can protect themselves from
the risk of undesirable outsiders gaining control of stock. They may
be also used for many other purposes such as to keep heirs from
demanding larger dividends or exercising a voice in the management
of the business. One of the most important reasons behind these
agreements is to establish a valuation of the stock for death tax
purposes when valuing it would be difficult due to its being seldom
traded. 2 Thereby the burden of overcoming the presumption of correct-
ness which attaches to the Commissioner's valuation is avoided. Hence
these agreements are both useful and necessary for small corporations.
While the effect of these agreements on the valuation of the stock
for Federal Estate Tax purposes has been rendered fairly certain by a
number of decisions, the valuation for the Wisconsin Inheritance Tax
is still largely undetermined since only a few such cases have arisen in
Wisconsin. It is the purpose of this note to aid the lawyer in drafting
these agreements by showing when the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue will probably accept the value set in an agreement, and by
attempting to predict, in the light of the few cases decided thus far,
when the Wisconsin Tax Department might do so also.
In order for the price set in the agreement to be accepted for
Federal Estate Tax purposes, it is necessary for the agreement to have
bound the decedent up to the time of his death, at least if he wished to
1Note, 5 A.L.R. 2d 1122 (1949).
2 Pavenstedt, The Second Circuit Reaffirms the Efficacy of Restrictive Stock
Agreements to Control Estate Tax Vahation, 51 Mica. L. REV. 1 (1952).
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dispose of the stock, and to bind his executor, after death, by at least
* conferring upon the other party to the agreement an irrevocable option
to purchase the stock exercisable after the optionor's death. To more
certainly establish the tax valuation, a fair and adequate consideration
should be given for the right to purchase the stock, the agreement
should not be apparently motivated by any tax avoidance scheme, and
the price fixed should be fair at the time the agreement is made.
The nature of the contractual undertak~ing of the vendor or
optionor should be the foremost concern of the attorney. Agreements
containing merely first offer restrictions3 binding" both the stockholder
and his estate have not been allowed to determine the tax valuation of
the shares on the ground that a stockholder should not be able to fix
the valuation of his shares by an agreement under which he is not
absolutely bound to dispose of them.4 However such a restriction may
have an effect on the market value of'the stock and thus be given effect
indirectly.5 This would be so where subsequent holders of the stock
are also bound by the restriction, for example when it is included in
the articles of incorporation. On the other hand, if the agreement
absolutely binds the executor to sell but no restriction is made on inter
vivos disposition, the price fixed again will not be accepted in deter-
mining the tax valuation on the ground that since the decedent could
have disposed of his entire holdings at market value any time during
his life, the agreement is intended *to take effect at or after death and
is includible in the gross estate at market value. 6
However, a recent case made clear that the stock will be valued at
the contract price for Federal Estate Tax purposes when a first offer
restriction during life is combined with an irrevocable option arising on
death binding the executor. 7 This case affirmed the rule laid down in
two prior cases that the contract valuation will be adopted only when the
decedent could not have disposed of the stock at other than the contract
price and his executor is bound to do so at least at the election of the
other party to the contract.8 The decedent's undertaking must include
these two covenants if the price set is to be accepted by the Com-
missioner.
3 First offer restrictions give the offeree a first option to purchase if the offeror
decides to sell.
4Louise N. Schulz. 14 B.T.A. 419 (1928); Michigan Trust Company et al,
27 B.T.A. 556 (1933).
5 Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1943).
6 INT. REv. CODE §811 (c) (1) (C); Mathews v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 525(1944). "The option indicates it was intended to take effect in possession and
enjoyment at or after the optionor's death and therefore the fair market value
of the property is includible in gross estate under the rationale of Helvering
v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106"; Hoffman v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 1160 (1943).
7 May v. McGowan, 194 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1951).8 Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1932) ; Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166
(2d Cir. 1936).
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Other requirements must also be met to insure the adoption of the
contract price. The agreement should be made by parties negotiating
at arms length to promote individual and often also mutual interests in
the best manner possible. In considering this, the court will look to the
consideration given for the right to purchase the stock, the contract
price, and the relation of the parties.
"-while a bona fide contract, based on adequate consideration,
to sell property for less than its value may fix the value of the
property for the purposes of the estate tax, a mere gratuitous
promise to permit some favored individual particularly the
natural object of the bounty of the promissor, to purchase it at a
grossly inadequate price can have no-such effect."9
Where a full and adequate consideration has not been given for the
contract, the stock has been valued at the market value on the grounds
that a gift or legacy of the difference between it and the option price
must have been intended.10 Of course mutual options and promises to
remain active in the business or to continue management policies will be
considered adequate. Furthermore if the sole or dominant purpose for
the agreement is determined to be a minimization of estate taxes, the
present rule may well be disregarded. Although in the May case" the
court said if a loophole was afforded it could be closed by the legis-
lature, no purpose to evade taxes was found in that case and courts in
other circuits may think differently on this point. In this respect also,
the price set in the option has an important bearing in showing the
contract to be bona fide, and though at the date of death there may be
a wide discrepancy between it and the market value, it would seem that
it should be a fair one at least on the day the option was given.12
The Michel case would apparently fulfill the test prescribed by the
May case since an enforceable contract right existed at the date of
death and no attempt to evade taxes was shown. Still the court said
that the interest passed under the terms of the will rather than under
the contract so no such rule needed to be applied, but if the legatee of
the shares had been someone other than the optionee, the case would
have been different. In such case apparently the court would have
been required to adopt either the "Federal Rule" or the so-called
"Pennsylvania Rule," the latter being that no agreement by property
owners can be binding on the state's appraisers but it will be considered
oHoffman v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 1160 (1943).
'OArmstrong's Estate v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. 77 (1944), 146 F.2d 457
(7 Cir. 1945).
"Supra, note 7.
12 In Commissioner v. Bensel, 36 B.T.A. 246, 100 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1938)
although at the time of death the market value of the stock was $60.00 per
share while the option price was $5.90, the decision of the board indicates
that this price was based on sales made approximately contemporaneously
with the agreement.
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along with other evidence in determining market value.1 3 An opposite
result on similar facts was reached in the Wilson case 14 where the
Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit accepted the contract price
holding that subsequent events should not be considered in determining
value at the date of death. In setting the value as of the time of death
regardless of whether the option was subsequently relinquished and the
stock taken under the will, this decision seems to adhere closer to the
statutory design. Although the Wisconsin Inheritance Tax is based on
the interest to which the living succeeds as distinguished from an estate
tax which is based on the interest which ceases by reason of the death,
still the Wisconsin Court has determined that the tax should be imposed
on the value of the property as it existed at the time of the death of the
deceased. 15
The Wisconsin Tax was patterned after a New York statute al-
though the latter has been subsequently changed. Thus the Wisconsin
Court has often cited decisions rendered by New York courts under
their former law. New York had adopted a rule similar to the present
"Federal Rule" before its statute was changed. In Re Jones' Wil'l"
which was cited in the Michel case as sustaining the proposition that
the property passed under the will in turn was based on In Re Howell's
Estate." Both cases concerned contracts to include provisions in wills.
In the Howell case the court said the testator merely agreed to bequeath
a portion of his estate provided that he possessed one and he was free
to consume his entire substance during his life. This same conclusion
was reached by a New York court in a case concerning an agreement
giving mutual options to purchase stock at death with no restriction on
inter vivos disposition. 8 This latter case was later distinguished in a
case in which inter vivos disposition was forbidden and on death or
severance from the company by one party the others were given an
option to purchase his stock.19 The court there said that this contract
was made in contemplation of withdrawal from the company, not of
death, that it took effect on execution, and death created no rights but
merely marked the time when they could be enforced.
Because the Wisconsin statute was copied from New York's and
since the Jones case20 was based on the New York rule that when
inter vivos disposition is not limited the transfer is intended to take
effect on death, it seems that Wisconsin would also follow the New
"3McLures Appeal, 347 Pa. 481, 32 A.2d 885 (1943).
"4Supra, note 8.
15 Will of Stevens, 177 Wis. 500, 188 N.W. 484 (1922).
16 206 Wis. 482, 240 N.W. 186 (1932).
17225 N.Y. 211, 174 N.E. 457 (1931).Is In Re Cory's Estate, 177 App. Div. 871, 164 N.Y.S. 956 (1917).
'19 In Re Fieux's Estate, 241 N.Y. 277, 149 N.E. 857 (1925).20 Supra, note 16.
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York rule when inter vivos disposition is restricted. Although in the
Michel case the contract was binding prior to death and the stock was
held to have passed under the will, the court stressed that this was
because of the fact situation there, the optionee being also made legatee
of the shares. Regardless of the merits of this decision when considered
in the light of the Wilson case 21 it seems safe to predict that at least
where that peculiar fact situation does not exist, the court would prob-
ably adopt the New York or so-called "Federal Rule."
Thus until further decisions clarify the present situation, it would
seem most advisable for the attorney in drafting one of these agree-
ments to fix its provisions with an eye to making the price set acceptable
to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and probably the Wisconsin
Tax Department will follow suit unless the option holder is bequeathed
the shares.
JOHN M. GROGAN
Damages-Measure of Damages for Anticipatory Repudiation
and Seller's Duty to Mitigate-By virtue of a binding contract the
plaintiff was to sell 500 tons of scrap steel to the defendant, delivery
to be made as specified in the contract. Prior to the time fixed for
performance the defendant cancelled its order for the purchase, pre-
sumably because the market for scrap steel was rapidly descending. The
plaintiff did not accept the repudiation as a breach of the contract and
subsequently requested the defendant to accept the scrap steel. At the
time of trial, about a year after the repudiation, the market value of
the steel was $6.00 per ton higher than the agreed purchase price.
Since the seller had retained the steel the defendant contended (1) that
the plaintiff had not been injured by the breach and therefore was not
entitled to any damages, and (2) the plaintiff had not discharged his
duty to mitigate damages as he had not sold the steel on the rapidly
descending market within a reasonable time after the repudiation.
Held: The measure of damages is the difference between the contract
price and the market price at the date of the breach of the contract
minus any savings derived by the plaintiff due to the defendant's breach,
such as transportation costs. Friedman Iron & Supply Co. v. J. B.
Beaird Co., Inc., 63 So. 2d 144 (La. 1953).
The issue presented is: what is the measure of damages, and what
is the seller's duty to mitigate, if any, in the case of an anticipatory
repudiation that is not accepted by the seller when the market value
of the goods is higher than the contract price at the time of trial?
The dissenting opinions in the instant case held that the plaintiff-
vendor had a duty to resell the steel as a condition precedent to an action
2 1 Supra, note 8.
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